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its legitimacy after announcing the Chief Executive Officer’s (CEO’s) pay in 2009 as well as 
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Telecom, the media and the public use the same remuneration logics to justify their positions. 
These remuneration logics are used to both justify and criticise Telecom’s CEO’s pay, 
although the media’s and public’s arguments are often unsophisticated and focus on the 
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1. Introduction 
After the announcement of the 2009 remuneration of Paul Reynolds, Chief Executive Officer 
(CEO) of Telecom Corporation of New Zealand Limited (Telecom), New Zealand’s two 
major newspapers printed the following headlines: “Telecom’s $5m boss gets bonus despite 
profit fall” (New Zealand Herald, 25 August 2009) and “Telecom board defends ‘shameless’
salary” (NZPA, 25 August 2009).  Wayne Boyd, Telecom’s Chairman justified Reynolds’ 
remuneration in saying, “Under Paul Reynolds’ leadership, our executive team has delivered 
on the demanding objectives set by the board over the past year” (NZPA, 25 August 2009).  
However, the announcement sparked much debate in the media and amongst the public about 
CEO pay.  There were hundreds of comments posted on websites beneath news articles and 
blogs.  The public debate culminated in Telecom’s Annual General Meeting, where Boyd 
provided spoke at length about how Reynolds’ remuneration was determined.  
Public scrutiny of executive remuneration is an international phenomenon, particularly since 
the Global Finance Crisis and subsequent recession in many economies.  In the US, John 
Thain, former CEO Merrill Lynch, was heavily criticised for bonuses paid to employees and a 
US$1.2 million renovation of his office (New York Times, 27 January 2009).  In the UK, the 
government, shareholders and the public have criticised executive bonuses leading to CEOs 
of several major banks forgoing their 2009 bonuses (Financial Times, 22 February 2010).  In 
Australia, Julia Gillard, Prime Minister is reportedly uncomfortable with the amount CEOs 
are paid (Sydney Morning Herald, 18 November 2010).  Further, these countries have 
introduced ‘say on pay’ regulations giving shareholders greater voice at annual general 
meetings.  These examples highlight the significance of executive remuneration to the public 
in Anglo-Saxon countries. 
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A company can lose the support of the public if its decisions are perceived to be illegitimate 
or unjustifiable.  For example, “Managing director David Baldwin said Contact lost 41,000 
electricity customers in the wake of last October’s board move to increase directors’ fees”
(New Zealand Herald, 15 August 2009).   Companies will attempt to manage societal 
expectations and maintain their legitimacy.  In an early US study of boards of directors, 
Harrison (1987) found that companies added committees to their board structure to enhance 
their legitimacy.  However, what is considered legitimate in terms of executive remuneration 
is cloudy.  Regulations and codes of practice are typically concerned with disclosure 
requirements, although codes of practice do outline processes for determining executive 
remuneration (Weight, 2008).  The shareholders’ and public’s expectations are far more 
uncertain than regulative and normative expectations.  
Research has examined the relationship between executive remuneration and a myriad of 
variables, particularly firm performance (Tosi et al., 2000; Gerhart et al., 2009).  Few studies 
have investigated executive remuneration in terms of organisational legitimacy.  Zajac and 
Westphal (1995) and Wade et al. (1997) found that US companies use remuneration logics to 
justify their decisions to the public, and shareholders (as measured by the movement in share 
price) do respond positively to certain remuneration logics.  Also, Core et al. (2008) found 
that media scrutiny does not alter executive remuneration in US companies.   Thus, the 
evidence indicates that companies do attempt to manage the legitimacy of executive 
remuneration (Scott, 2008), but the media’s ability to scrutinise executive remuneration may 
be overstated (Core et al., 2008).  However, no studies have examined what individual 
members of the public think about specific instances of executive remuneration.
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The case of Paul Reynolds’ 2009 remuneration presents a unique opportunity to study 
organisational legitimacy and societal expectations.  Telecom’s 2009 annual report includes a 
section on CEO remuneration (about 3 pages or 2,000 words), and Wayne Boyd’s speech at 
Telecom’s annual general meeting included much explanation of CEO remuneration (about 
1,500 words).  There are at least 12 newspaper articles and blogs about Reynolds’ 2009 
remuneration and many of these online media allowed the public to add comments.  This 
paper investigates how Telecom justified Reynolds’ remuneration, and how the media and 
public reacted to the announcement of Reynolds’ remuneration.  Specifically, this paper 
identifies and analyses the remuneration logics (or reasons) that Telecom, the media, and 
members of the public give to justify their position.  
This paper is organised as follows. The literature is reviewed in section 2, particularly studies 
on organisational legitimacy and executive remuneration.  The research questions and method 
is outlined in section 3.  The texts are studied using content analysis.  Telecom’s background 
including its history, CEO remuneration and firm performance over time, and key events in 
2009 are described in section 4.  The findings describe what reasons Telecom, the media, and 
the public give to justify their positions, and analyse the sophistication of their arguments in 
section 5.  A discussion of the findings is presented in section 6. Conclusions including 
theoretical and practical implications are given in section 7.
2. Literature Review 
There is a paradox in the research on executive remuneration.  There is no economically
significant relationship between executive remuneration and firm performance (Tosi et al., 
2000; Devers et al., 2007), yet the majority of listed companies use performance-based 
remuneration (Weight, 2008; Crombie, 2009).  Rost and Osterloh (2009) found that the 
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sensitivity of CEO pay to firm performance is decreasing over time and conclude that 
performance-based remuneration is a managerial fashion.  In a study of executives’ 
perceptions of stock options, St-Onge et al. (2001) found that there are many reasons why 
stocks options are used to remunerate executives including to motivate, link pay and 
performance, and reward executives with valuable skills and experience.  In a similar study, 
Beer and Katz (2003) concluded that performance-based remuneration is used to increase the 
level of executive remuneration, rather than to link pay to performance.
Prior research has investigated the efficiency of performance-based remuneration, rather than 
its legitimacy.  If performance-based remuneration is a managerial fashion, then companies 
can use it to enhance their legitimacy in the eyes of stakeholders.  However, there has been 
scant research on how companies legitimate themselves with respect to executive 
remuneration.  Zajac and Westphal (1995; 2004) found that US companies use remuneration 
logics to enhance their legitimacy to shareholders.  They found that when announcing the 
adoption of long-term incentive plans, shareholders responded more positively if the 
announcement used the agency and/or human resources logics.  But they did not study other 
remuneration logics.  
2.1. Discourse on Executive Remuneration
Remuneration logics are systems of reasoning which organisational and their actors use to 
explain or justify remuneration practices to themselves and others. Remuneration logics can 
be found in the press releases and annual reports of companies as well as regulations and 
codes of practice (Wade et al., 1997; Crombie, 2009).  There are many remuneration logics 
and examples can be found in literature (see table 1). Companies use remuneration logics to 
provide an explanation to convince shareholders and investors about their remuneration 
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practices and consequently this affects their legitimacy.  Also, codes of best practices are 
issued by associations (e.g. an institute of directors) and are intended to provide a guide as to 
what is best practice in terms of executive compensation. This is intended to influence 
companies and support the legitimacy of regulators and associations.  However, research has 
not investigated whether the media or the public also use remuneration logics to evaluate the 
remuneration practices of companies.
---------------------------
Insert table 1 here
---------------------------
2.2. Legitimacy Theory
Suchman (1995, pg. 574) adopted a broad definition of legitimacy, defining it as “a 
generalised perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper or 
appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs and 
definitions.” This particular definition of legitimacy asserts that a social contract exists 
between the entity and society. Maintaining legitimacy is an ongoing issue organisations face. 
Organisations need to provide assurances to society about their ongoing performance through 
“warm signals” such as speeches or long term contracts (Ashforth and Gibbs, 1990). This 
contributes to maintaining a social contract with society. Organisations are not able to 
completely satisfy society’s expectations but maintaining legitimacy is about communicating 
with audiences and letting them know what is happening. 
A potential threat to a company’s legitimacy is negative publicity about an excessive 
remuneration payout to executives (Core, 2008). To protect their legitimacy, companies use 
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remuneration logics to justify executive remuneration practices. Wade et al. (1997) studied 
how a sample of US companies justified their remuneration practices and found that 
companies either emphasised or downplayed justifications depending on their financial 
performance. They found that companies that paid their CEO a large amount of base salary 
were more likely to justify practices by the use of consultants, while companies with high 
accounting returns tended to downplay market returns in their justification. 
Legitimacy theory is often used to describe how companies act in reporting social and 
environmental disclosures (Cho and Patten, 2007). Disclosures are used to legitimise an 
organisation’s practices or to alter society’s perceptions of the organisation. Deegan and 
Gordon (1996) found that there was a significant increase in Australian companies’ 
environmental disclosures over time, supported by an increase in society’s awareness relating 
to environmental issues. Organisations are also known to increase disclosure if they perceive 
their legitimacy is threatened. For example, during the 1970s, BHP’s environmental 
disclosures increased when the mining, steel and oil industries were under public pressure
(Guthrie and Parker, 1989). Deegan and Gordon (1996, p. 187) also found that disclosure 
practices by organisations were often “self laudatory” in promoting positive aspects of 
organisational performance while minimising or failing to disclose negative aspects. This is 
consistent with Patten (2002), who also found that organisations with poorer environmental 
performance provided more positive disclosures in their reports.
There are four aspects of organisational legitimacy (Ashforth and Gibbs, 1990; Suchman, 
1995). Firstly, gaining legitimacy is an important step for new organisations or organisations 
who introduces new product lines. Secondly, maintaining legitimacy is an issue organisations 
are faced with and coupled with the dynamicity of society’s values; organisations need to be 
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responsive to any potential threat to their legitimacy. Thirdly, defending legitimacy occurs 
when an organisation’s legitimacy is threatened. Lastly, should an organisation find itself in a 
crisis, it must attempt to repair its legitimacy. However, there has been scant research on how 
organisations gain, maintain and defend the legitimacy of their CEOs pay. 
It is usually the executives of large, publicly traded firms who are the subject of public 
criticism. This discourse on executive remuneration is important as it shapes society’s 
expectations about executive remuneration. Society will be influenced by articles and press 
releases issued by media, professional associations and academics. Phillips, Lawrence, and 
Hardy (2004) proposed a model showing the relationships between action and discourse. 
They argue that action affects discourse through the production of texts such as books and 
annual reports.  In the case of executive remuneration, the legitimacy of CEO pay depends on 
society’s perception based on press releases issued by media, professional associations and 
academics. 
2.3. The Media and Executive Remuneration
Media produces a vast array of discourse that appears in print and on websites, which allows
society to gather and evaluate information about events in the world. Core, Guay, and 
Larcker (2008) argued that the media tailors news to a positive or negative tone depending on 
public opinion. The media also acts as a “watchdog” for larger firms, where the public is 
likely to find the story interesting (Core, et al., 2008, p. 3). They also found that the press 
focuses on excess pay, where it is defined as “the residual from an expected compensation 
model that controls for standard economic determinants” as opposed to raw pay (Core, et al.,
2008, p. 2). Moreover, they also found that despite the negative press coverage, there was no 
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evidence that it caused the firm to change their remuneration policies, suggesting that the 
media are not the most powerful stakeholder of publicly listed companies.
However, the media does have the ability to influence the legitimacy of an organisation 
(Brown and Deegan, 1998). Organisations will either defend or change their practices 
depending on society’s response or their perception of society’s possible response. Liu, 
Taylor, and Harris (2006) found that organisations provided additional disclosures when the 
company received media attention on executive remuneration. This is consistent with other 
studies which found a positive correlation between increased public pressure and 
environmental disclosures (Brown and Deegan, 1998; Patten, 2002). Although there has been 
extensive research on the impact of media on environmental disclosure, little research has 
been done on how stakeholders respond to reports in the media of executive remuneration. 
The media is a powerful force in shaping society’s perceptions of reality, and can sets the 
public agenda by making the public aware of the issues (McCombs, 2004). The concentration 
of media coverage also influences the importance of topics (McCombs, 2004). The media 
also responds to the public’s demands for information. If a large proportion of the news was 
dedicated to a topic, it will be acknowledged as being more important and of interest to the 
public. Hamilton and Zeckhauser (2004) explored the issue of media coverage of CEOs and 
found that media coverage is determined by market forces such as audience demands.
Consequently, major newspapers tend to focus on publications that will “entertain and attract” 
readers and are more likely to focus on negative news about CEOs (Hamilton and Zeckhauser, 
2004, p. 7).
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Over the past decade, a new form of media, blogging, has become increasingly important. 
Merriam-Webster, cited in Kelleher and Miller (2006) announced the word of the year in 
2004 to be “blogs.” A blog can be defined as “a web page with minimal to no external editing, 
providing on-line commentary, periodically updated and presented in reverse chronological 
order, with hyperlinks to other online sources” (Drezner and Farrell, 2004, p. 5). There are 
many advantages of blogs which have contributed to their popularity. Blogs are easy to set up 
on the internet, making it an inexpensive and a convenient way to capture a range of 
audiences. The flexibility of blogging allows members of the public to express their 
comments to audiences, while at the same time interacting with others, displaying a variety of 
opinions. Blogs enables members of society to express their opinions quickly, which increases
society’s response to external events (Herring, et al., 2007). In the context of executive 
remuneration, blogs are an important forum for public debate, but there has been no research 
on blogs and executive remuneration. 
2.4. Gap in the Literature
The literature review highlights that it is the media’s and public’s opinion can influence 
companies, and companies use remuneration logics to justify their executive remuneration 
practices to stakeholders, particularly shareholders.  Companies are required to disclose how 
much and how the CEO is remunerated in their annual reports. Drawing on this information, 
the public forms an opinion of the company which can add to or subtract from organisational 
legitimacy. The media can shape the public’s perceptions of executive remuneration. 
However, what are societal expectations on executive remuneration and how an organisation 
manages the legitimacy of executive remuneration has been rarely studied.  It is expected that 
companies will face a legitimacy crisis if the media’s and the public’s response to their 
executive remuneration practices is negative and homogenous.  In this case, companies will 
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alter their executive remuneration practices or risk losing legitimacy. On the other hand, if the 
media’s and public’s response is heterogeneous, then companies will be able to defend their 
executive remuneration practices without a loss of legitimacy.  
3. Research Method
This research investigates how Telecom justified Paul Reynolds’ 2009 remuneration and how 
the media and the public reacted to the announcement of Reynolds’ remuneration.  The 
remuneration logics (or reasons) embedded within this discourse on executive remuneration 
are identified and analysed.  The findings generate insight into what are societal expectations 
and how organisational legitimacy can be managed.  By studying the public’s reaction to 
Reynolds’ remuneration, this research highlights the nature of societal expectations.  By 
studying Telecom’s announcement and subsequent defence of Reynolds’ remuneration, this 
research shows how an organisation can manage its legitimacy.  Thus, this research extends 
the literature on executive remuneration and legitimacy theory.
This research draws on an interpretative methodology as it emphasises, “the role of language, 
interpretation, and understanding in social science,” (Chua, 1986, p. 613).  While the methods 
for how the CEO should be remunerated has become taken-for-granted (Crombie, 2009), 
these interpretations are socially constructed and open to interpretation.  It is likely that 
Telecom (i.e. the board of directors), the media and the public will interpret Reynolds’ 
remuneration and performance differently.  Using the case study method and content analysis, 
this research seeks to understand how Telecom, the media, and the public justify their 
opinions.  Instead of evaluating whether Reynolds’ remuneration is justifiable, this research 
evaluates why Telecom, the media and the public believe Reynolds’ remuneration is or is not 
justifiable.
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3.1. The Case Study
The case study is focused on the announcement of Reynolds’ remuneration on 21 August 
2009 and the subsequent media and public debate, which culminated in Telecom’s annual 
general meeting on 1 October 2009.  There was negligible media interest in Reynolds’ 
remuneration following the annual general meeting.  Telecom’s 2009 annual report and 
minutes from the annual general meeting were collected.  Also, 7 newspaper articles and 5 
blogs published in this period were collected.  The public was able to comment on many of 
these documents as they were published online.  The public’s comments were also collected. 
There were 359 comments, but 237 comments were discarded because they did not include 
specific references to Reynolds’ remuneration, leaving 122 comments that were analysed.
The main assumption is that the members of the public who commented on the newspaper 
articles and blogs are representative of the general population.  The identity of these people is 
entirely anonymous.  There is no way of knowing whether the sample is or is not 
representative. However, this risk is mitigated as all newspaper articles and blogs about 
Reynolds’ remuneration were collected, ensuring comments on these documents were from 
the widest possible readership.  Further, two of the bloggers are well-known, John Minto and 
Bruce Sheppard, and have opposing political views.  John Minto is a left-wing union 
supporter, while Bruce Sheppard is a right-wing shareholder activist.  As the readers of these 
blogs are likely to have diverse political views, the comments should not be skewed by 
political ideology. 
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3.2. Content Analysis
Content analysis of the documents collected was used to understand how Telecom, the media, 
and the public justified their opinions. This is consistent with prior research on disclosure in 
annual reports (e.g. Smith and Taffler, 2000; Beattie and Thomson, 2007).  Bryman and Bell 
(2007, p. 304) defines content analysis as “an approach to the analysis of documents and texts 
that seeks to quantify content in terms of predetermined categories and in a systematic and
replicable manner.” Drawing on the literature, an inventory of remuneration logics is 
identified.  A close reading on several of Telecom’s annual report, several newspaper articles 
and blogs, and some of the public’s comments confirms the presence of these and other 
remuneration logics.  Both researchers reviewed a range of texts and discussed their findings, 
in order to be certain that all the remuneration logics were identified.
Once the sample of texts was collected, all of the relevant sections of the texts (i.e. those on
Reynolds’ remuneration) were copied into Microsoft Excel TM.  The content analysis 
consisted of two coding phases.  First, the tone of the media’s and public’s discourse were 
categorised as supporting, not supporting or neutral towards Reynolds’ remuneration. The 
unit of analysis was the whole text, e.g. newspaper article, blog and comment. Second, the 
presence of the remuneration logics in Telecom’s, the media’s, and the public’s discourse 
were coded.  Again, the unit of analysis was the whole text.  10 remuneration logics were 
identified, but there were many other remuneration logics that were rarely used. These were 
included in the other category.  For example, a few members of the public suggest that 
Reynolds’ remuneration was justified because his income is taxed.  The remuneration logics, 
descriptions and examples are shown in table 2.
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---------------------------
Insert table 2 here
---------------------------
The remuneration logics are systems of reasoning used by organisations and individuals to 
explain or justify their decisions or opinions to themselves and others.  The 10 remuneration 
logics cover many aspects of Reynolds’ remuneration.  The absolute level, market, human 
resources, responsibility, and experience logics are concerned with how much Reynolds is 
remunerated.  The agency, contribution, effort, pay-for-performance, and target logics are 
concerned with how Reynolds is remunerated.  Essentially, the remuneration logics are 
principles which organisations use to structure executive remuneration.  The media and the 
public can use the remuneration logics to evaluate the efficacy of Telecom’s executive 
remuneration structure or practices.  However, the remuneration logics do not provide 
principles for every aspect of Reynolds’ remuneration.  For example, they are silent on how 
much remuneration should be paid in cash or equity, and the length of the vesting period for 
long-term incentive schemes. 
The main limitation of content analysis is that it reduces the data to a series of numbers.  For 
example, the remuneration logics are either present or absent in the texts.  To overcome this 
limitation, the content analysis is supported by a qualitative, narrative analysis of the texts.  
This provides a richer, deeper understanding of the discourse on executive remuneration.  
This can be in the form of disclosure on how much the CEO is paid and how the organisation 
justifies these decisions using remuneration logics.  The narrative analysis places an emphasis 
on the meaning of the text, which supports the interpretive methodology that language has an 
influence in shaping the world (Bryman and Bell, 2007; Potter, 1997). Data in the form of 
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comments made by the public are examined to explore the relationship between discourse and 
the social world. This enables comparisons between Telecom’s, the media’s and public’s 
discourse to be made, and contextualises the findings from the content analysis.
3.3. Limitations and Assumptions
The methods used in this study have certain inherent limitations. Firstly, the case study 
method used can be criticised as being difficult to replicate. The exact context of the firm, 
society, and media scrutiny occurred at one point in time. However, this study could be 
replicated when outlier pay is announced elsewhere in the world. Secondly, there are 
problems of generalisation where one case might not be representative of all cases. This 
research is based on a qualitative case study on a single company in New Zealand at a point in 
time. It does not capture society’s dynamicity and factors that constantly cause society to
change. For example, a major post-study event relating to Telecom was the failure of its new 
XT network, and this may have changed the public’s perception of Reynolds’ remuneration. 
Generalisation is also difficult in different countries where values may differ. The Oxford 
Mini Dictionary (1981, p. 432; 58) defined socialism as “political and economic theory that 
resources, industries, and transport should be owned and managed by the State,” while 
capitalism is defined as “a system in which trade and industry are controlled by private 
owners.” Consequently a country with values of a capitalist nature will differ from those of a 
socialist nature. Thirdly, this research involves interpretation of comments and documents 
which may be criticised as being too subjective. In some aspects, data will be interpreted 
according to the researcher’s point of view. Fourthly, the data collected may be limited in 
scope as it might not reflect all groups of society and stakeholders equally. Comments on 
blogs might not be representative of the whole population. However, this is mitigated by 
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having John Minto’s blog representing the left-wing views while Bruce Sheppard’s blog leans 
towards the right-wing views. 
4. Background
Prior to 1987, the New Zealand Post Office was a government department comprising 
telecommunication, banking and postal services.  Following the election of the Fourth Labour 
Government on 26 July 1984, the public sector was radically changed including the 
corporatisation and privatisation of many government departments. The New Zealand Post 
Office was broken up into three state-owned enterprises on 1 April 1987, one of which was 
Telecom.  As a state-owned enterprise, Telecom was legislated to act in a commercial manner.  
Then the government deregulated the telecommunications industry and prepared Telecom for 
privatisation. In 1990, Telecom was sold for $4.25 billion to a consortium led by Ameritech 
and Bell Atlantic.  As part of the conditions of sale, Telecom was listed on the New Zealand, 
Australian and New York Stock Exchanges in 1991 and the consortium significantly reduced 
their shareholding over time.  Telecom has been New Zealand’s largest publicly listed 
company until recently.
Table 3 shows Telecom’s financial performance from 1991 to 2009.  During the 1990s, 
Telecom’s financial performance was very stable as its earnings and dividends grew steadily.  
The financial figures do not reflect the turbulent times as both telecommunication’s 
technology and Telecom’s business model radically changed (Erakovic and Wilson, 2006).  
While Telecom faced competition in the 1990s, it did not intensify until early 2000s when 
Telstra (an Australian company) and Vodafone (a UK company) had gained a significant 
market share.  This is reflected in Telecom’s financial performance which became 
increasingly volatile in the 2000s. The high profit in 2007 was due to the sale of Telecom’s 
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directory business, Yellow Pages, for $2.24 billion.  Telecom has invested heavily in 
technology and expanded its revenue base over time while still providing a high dividend 
yield for shareholders.  However, Telecom’s billion dollar investment in AAPT (Australian 
Associated Press Telecommunications) has been unsuccessful with much of its value being 
written off over time.
---------------------------
Insert table 3 here
---------------------------
Figure 1 shows the total shareholder return for Telecom and all companies listed on the New 
Zealand Stock Exchange (NZX) from 1992 to 2010.  It is assumed that all dividends are 
reinvested.  As Telecom’s market capitalisation was the largest on the NZX, representing 
about 20-30%, the return indexes of Telecom and the NZX are highly correlated.  The effects 
of the dotcom bubble are highlighted by the rapid fall of Telecom’s return index from 2000 to 
2001.  Telecom’s adjusted share price went from $2.62 in 1992 to $6.54 in 1997 and then to 
$8.97 in 1999 (as at the balance date).  It subsequently fell back to $5.54 in 2001.  Similarly, 
the Global Financial Crisis has affected both the NZX’s and Telecom’s return indexes from 
2008 to 2009.  Further, Telecom’s share price fell rapidly from $4.51 in 2007 to $2.73 in 2009 
as the Government signalled in 2006 its intention to unbundle Telecom’s cooper network.  
Overall, Telecom’s market performance has been more volatile than its financial performance. 
---------------------------
Insert figure 1 here
---------------------------
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Figure 2 shows how much Telecom remunerated its CEOs from 1997 to 20091.  Telecom has 
had four CEOs: Dr. Peter Troughton (1987 to 1992); Dr. Roderick Deane (1992 to 1999); 
Theresa Gattung (1999 to 2007); and Dr. Paul Reynolds (2007 to current).  Telecom’s CEOs’ 
remuneration packages are comparable to those in Anglo-Saxon countries with a significant 
performance-based component.  Generally, the short-term incentives are dependent on 
financial performance targets, while the long-term incentives are dependent on market 
performance targets.  The remuneration figures in figure 2 are taken Telecom’s annual reports
and include actual (e.g. cash) and expected (e.g. share options and restricted shares) 
remuneration.  For example, Telecom used the Black-Scholes methodology to determine the 
value of the share options awarded.  Telecom’s CEO will have received a different amount of 
remuneration than is reported as actual performance invariably differs from expected 
performance.
---------------------------
Insert figure 2 here
---------------------------
The amount of remuneration that Telecom’s board of directors has awarded its CEOs over 
time has increased every year except in 2000, 2006 and 2008.  Gattung’s remuneration in 
2000 was low because she was CEO for only part of the year as Deane retired part way 
through the financial year.  In 2006, Telecom reported a net loss of $435 million, resulting in 
Gattung’s short-term incentive to decrease from $1.32 million in 2005 to $0.66 million in 
                                                
1 The Companies Act 1993 required companies to disclosure from 1997 onwards the number of employees 
receiving remuneration greater than $100,000 (in $10,000 bands) and directors’ remuneration.  Hence, there is 
no information available on how much Telecom remunerated its CEOs prior to 1997.  Also, as the mandatory 
disclosure requirements are limited, the breakdown of the CEOs’ remuneration has only been voluntarily 
disclosed since 2003. 
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2006 (although her salary increased from $1.1 million in 2005 to $1.25 million in 2006).  In 
2007, Gattung’s remuneration included a $1.8 million severance payment.  Putting aside this 
severance payment, Reynolds’ remuneration in 2008 was higher than Gattung’s remuneration 
in 2007.  While figure 2 shows that Telecom does use performance-based remuneration as the 
CEOs’ short- and long-term incentives have varied with performance, the sensitivity of total 
CEO remuneration to performance is questionable.  Total CEO remuneration has steadily 
increased over time despite significant declining and volatile financial and market 
performance in recent years.  
Table 4 shows Telecom’s CEO remuneration in 2009 relative to other New Zealand listed 
companies.  Telecom’s market capitalisation is the second highest, CEO pay is the highest in 
absolute terms, and CEO pay is the fifth highest in relative terms.  Telecom is the only 
telecommunications company listed on the New Zealand Exchange, so direct comparisons are 
not possible. However, telecommunications and energy companies are similar in that they 
both operate in competitive markets and manage a network of lines.  On that basis, Telecom is 
overpaying its CEO relative to energy companies.  CEO remuneration at Telecom is certainly 
at the top-end of the market, but whether its CEO’s remuneration is unjustified is a matter of 
opinion.  The legitimacy of CEO remuneration at Telecom is investigated in the findings 
section.
---------------------------
Insert table 4 here
---------------------------
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Table 5 shows the number of articles in the New Zealand Herald on executive remuneration 
from 1994 to 2009.  The number of articles has increased since 1997 when the reporting of 
remuneration became mandatory.  The percentage of these articles that include comment on 
Telecom is also shown. Coverage of Telecom constituted 14% of the total coverage on
executive remuneration. This highlights that executive remuneration has been a consistent 
topic of media and public interest over time.  In 2009, 25% of articles on executive 
remuneration related to Telecom. As Reynolds’ 2009 remuneration was by far the highest that 
a CEO of a New Zealand listed company has ever received, the media and public scrutiny was 
significantly higher than in any other year.
---------------------------
Insert table 5 here
---------------------------
Table 6 shows the timeline of events from the appointment of Dr Paul Reynolds as CEO to 
Telecom’s 2009 Annual General Meeting. Telecom has declining earnings leading up to the 
announcement of Reynolds’ 2009 remuneration.  Also, Telecom had frozen executives’ 
salaries, but short- and long-term incentives were still paid.  The announcement of Reynolds’
remuneration led to much debate in the media and public.  In particular, two well-known blog 
writers posted opposing views on Reynolds’ remuneration.  John Minto, a left-wing union 
supporter, wrote two blogs attacking Reynolds’ remuneration.  Bruce Sheppard, a right-wing 
shareholder activist, wrote one blog supporting Reynolds’ remuneration (although his support 
is qualified).  These and other blogs and newspaper articles attracted many comments from 
members of the public.  This media and public scrutiny culminated in Wayne Boyd’s speech 
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at Telecom’s annual general meeting, defending Reynolds’ remuneration.  The next section 
presents an analysis of these events.
---------------------------
Insert table 6 here
---------------------------
5. Findings
This research identifies the remuneration logics that Telecom, the media, and members of the 
public use to explain or justify their position on Dr. Paul Reynolds’ 2009 remuneration.  Also, 
this research analyses the discourse of Telecom, the media and the public to gain insight into 
what is legitimate or socially acceptable, and how Telecom manages societal expectations.  
The main findings are a content analysis of Telecom’s annual report and annual general 
meeting minutes, newspaper articles and blogs as well as members of the public’s comments 
on these articles and blogs.  The narratives underlying the content analysis for each group are 
discussed and then compared.  In light of these findings, Reynolds’ 2010 remuneration is also 
discussed, particularly changes in the way his remuneration was disclosed in the annual report.
Upon announcing Reynolds’ 2009 remuneration, the New Zealand Herald article stated that 
Reynolds earned $5 million while the Dominion Post article stated that Reynolds earned $7 
million.  The figures are different because the New Zealand Herald article did not include 
Reynolds’ 678,910 performance rights (valued at $2.1 million), which may be unrealised if 
absolute and relative total shareholder return hurdles are not met in three years.  In fact, 
Reynolds’ cash remuneration is $3,831,450 (salary of $1,700,000, performance incentive paid 
in cash of $1,837,500, and special payments of $243,950) and unrealised remuneration is 
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$3,325,000 (performance incentive paid in restricted shares of $1,225,000 and performance 
rights of $2,100,000).  To evaluate the efficacy of Reynolds’ 2009 remuneration, the 
complexities of equity-based remuneration (e.g. vesting periods and hurdles) need to be 
considered.  While Reynolds’ remuneration is accurately described in newspapers articles, the 
difference between realised (or cash) and unrealised (or conditional) remuneration is not 
clearly explained.
The remuneration logics capture some of the complexities of Telecom’s CEO remuneration 
package, but none of the remuneration logics focus on the distinction between realised and 
unrealised remuneration.  The number of times the remuneration logics are present within the 
discourse of Telecom (annual report and annual general meeting), the media (7 newspaper 
articles and 5 blogs) and the public (122 comments) is presented in table 7.  Telecom used a 
variety of remuneration logics to justify Reynolds pay in the annual report, and these and 
other remuneration logics were used by the Chairman at the annual general meeting.  
Newspaper articles did not use any remuneration logics, except for ‘absolute level’.  While 
they focused on reporting ‘the facts’ of Reynolds’ remuneration, they also sensationalised the 
amount of remuneration he received.  Blogs did use a variety of remuneration logics to 
evaluate the efficacy of Reynolds’ remuneration.  Many of the public’s comments included 
multiple remuneration logics.  Those using the ‘absolute level’ logic generally opposed the 
amount of remuneration Reynolds received.
---------------------------
Insert table 7 here
---------------------------
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The most frequently present remuneration logics in the discourse are: Absolute level, pay-for-
performance, effort, market, and responsibility.  This suggests that societal expectations are: 
irrespective of position, there is an absolute level of remuneration that anyone should be able 
to earn; and a CEO’s remuneration should reflect their responsibility and effort, changes in 
firm performance, and the market level of remuneration.  However, these societal 
expectations are not clearly defined constructs.  As the remuneration logics are principles 
rather than rules, it is difficult and highly subjective to judge Reynolds’ remuneration using 
remuneration logics.  The media’s and public’s opinion of Reynolds’ remuneration is divided 
based on political ideology.  Those against Reynolds’ remuneration believe that it is 
inequitable because the gap between Reynolds’ remuneration and the average worker is too 
wide.  Those for Reynolds’ remuneration believe that it is justified because it is determined by 
market forces.
5.1. Telecom’s Discourse
Telecom’s discourse is akin to rhetoric as it is designed to persuade the reader that Reynolds’ 
remuneration is justified.  The annual report uses the remuneration logics and references to 
external advisors to justify Reynolds’ remuneration. The discourse is heavily entrenched in 
the pay-for-performance logic: “performance-based so that the package is directly linked to 
performance outcomes” (Telecom, 2009, p. 124).  The section of the annual report on CEO 
remuneration covers: the employment agreement, termination benefits, general remuneration, 
performance incentive scheme, performance rights scheme, and performance entitlements 
scheme.  There is no discussion of how the CEO’s fixed remuneration is determined, but there 
is detailed discussion of how the CEO’s pay is linked to performance. However, the specific 
targets on which the CEO’s remuneration depends are not disclosed. The section of CEO 
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remuneration concludes with a table detailing the components of Reynolds’ remuneration, but 
no total figure is given.
Telecom’s Chairman Wayne Boyd discussed executive remuneration at the annual general 
meeting in both his initial address and then during formal business. Boyd’s speech included 
many remuneration logics used to persuade the audience of the efficacy of Reynolds’ 
remuneration. Other justifications were also given.  For example, Boyd said that, “…it is 
appropriate that the executive team is rewarded for leading what is already New Zealand’s 
most complex business through a complete rebuild.” Boyd also highlighted that Telecom 
discloses more information about executive remuneration than is required under New Zealand
law and Stock Exchange listing rules, and that Reynolds’ employment contract was fully 
disclosed to the public upon his appointment.  Implicitly, Boyd is suggesting that the 
shareholders and the public should not be surprised by Reynolds’ remuneration.
During formal business, Boyd provided much detail of Telecom’s executive remuneration 
practices.  This was probably due to the amount of questions submitted by shareholders prior 
to the annual general meeting. Again, Boyd justified Reynolds’ remuneration using a variety 
of remuneration logics.  For example, he appealed to the market logic in saying, “And we 
compete for executive talent in a highly competitive global market.” The remuneration logics 
used were consistent with those used in the annual report. A PowerPoint slide was shown to 
illustrate the components of Reynolds’ remuneration. It was also highlighted that more than 
two thirds was at risk and that both short and long-term incentives are performance tested.  
Boyd emphasised that, “Under Paul Reynolds’ leadership, our executive team has delivered 
on the demanding objectives set by the Board over the past year.”
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The components of Reynolds’ remuneration were separately described and justified. Boyd 
explained that Reynolds will only receive his performance rights only if the targets are met in
three years when the rights and entitlements vest, highlighting the unrealised component of 
the remuneration. A variety of performance objectives on which Reynolds’ short-term 
incentives are dependent were disclosed including group financial performance, customer 
satisfaction, and leadership. Each performance objective was explained in detail including 
how Reynolds had met the 2009 targets. Boyd concluded with a reassurance that the Board is 
monitoring national and international surveys in relation to executive remuneration. 
Surprisingly, there were no questions from the audience on Reynolds’ remuneration, but there 
was one question on the Chief Financial Officer’s remuneration.  
5.2. The Media’s Discourse 
Table 7 shows that the media uses a variety of remuneration logics to justify their position, 
and these are the same remuneration logics as Telecom uses.  Although the newspaper articles 
focus on describing Reynolds’ remuneration and sensationalising the amount he was paid.  
The blogs evaluate Reynolds’ remuneration in greater depth than the newspaper articles, and 
use many of the remuneration logics to evaluate it.  Of the 7 newspaper articles, 2 were 
neutral and 5 were unsupportive of Reynolds’ remuneration.  Of the 5 blogs, 2 were 
supportive and 3 were unsupportive of Reynolds’ remuneration.  Two main reasons were 
given why Reynolds’ remuneration was unjustified: Telecom’s profits had decreased and 
Reynolds’ pay relative to the average worker is too high.  One main reason was given for why 
Reynolds’ remuneration was justified: Reynolds has a difficult job to improve Telecom’s 
performance as its faces a challenging competitive and regulatory environment.
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There were three blogs attacking Reynolds’ remuneration.  John Minto a well-known political 
activist and left-wing union supporter wrote two blogs on Reynolds’ remuneration.  The first 
blog focused on Telecom’s history and the plight of the line engineers.  He agreed with Union
leader, Andrew Little’s assertion that Reynolds’ pay is “shameless greed”. The second blog 
focused on the ratio of CEO to worker pay.  He argued that the ratio should be set at 10 times 
the minimum yearly wage and regulated by the Government, so that CEOs are incentivised to 
increase both the their and the average workers’ remuneration. Tapu Misa’s blog also focuses 
on the ratio between CEO and average worker pay.  She argued that societal problems are 
positively correlated with this ratio, and concludes that, “we all pay the price when we 
become more unequal and unfair as a society”.
There were two blogs supporting Reynolds’ remuneration. Kerre Woodham argued that 
Reynolds’ remuneration is deserved because it is comparable to other telecommunication 
companies around the world and his job is particularly difficult.  Also, Woodham argued that 
people should not be paid equally because history has shown that Communist societies fail.  
Bruce Sheppard provides the balanced discussion of Reynolds’ remuneration.  He argues that 
Reynolds is improving Telecom’s culture and putting customers first.  Given that Telecom 
uses performance-based remuneration, Reynolds met the board’s performance targets, and 
Reynolds is an internationally mobile executive, Sheppard believes that on balance Reynolds’ 
remuneration is justified.  As the Chairman of the Shareholders’ Association, Sheppard argues 
that excessive remuneration is justifiable as long as the CEO is delivering shareholder value.  
Overall, Sheppard believes that Reynolds is revitalising Telecom’s future prospects.
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5.3. The Public’s Discourse 
Table 8 shows the number and percentage of comments that were supportive, neutral, or 
unsupportive of Reynolds’ remuneration.  The researchers expected that the vast majority of 
the public’s comments would be unsupportive of Reynolds’ remuneration.  Surprisingly, the 
public’s opinion of Reynolds’ remuneration was heterogeneous.  Only 38% of the public’s 
comments were unsupportive, while 35% were neutral and 27% were supportive.  The 
opinions of members of the public were not swayed by tone of the newspaper article or blog 
on which they were commenting.  For example, comments from members of the public on 
John Minto’s blog ranged from “totally agree” to “Communist drivel”.  
---------------------------
Insert table 8 here
---------------------------
While there were 359 comments posted, only 122 comments specifically discussed Reynolds’ 
remuneration.  These comments ranged from a short sentence to several paragraphs.  
Members of the public used a variety of remuneration logics to justify their opinion including 
some that used multiple remuneration logics.  Table 9 shows the presence of the remuneration 
logics in the public’s disclosure.  Their comments have been categorised by their tone.  The 
absolute level logic was the most frequently used followed by effort, market, and pay-for-
performance.  Interestingly, the remuneration logics were used to both justify and criticise 
Reynolds’ remuneration.  This highlights that the remuneration logics are part of New 
Zealand society’s shared understanding of how remuneration is determined.
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---------------------------
Insert table 9 here
---------------------------
Comments supporting Reynolds’ remuneration mainly included the effort, absolute level, 
market, and responsibility logics. For example, one person argued that, “people like 
Reynolds… earn their keep… CEO roles are hard work… [and] Telecom met their planned 
targets.”  Several people commented that the media and other comments were envious of 
Reynolds’ remuneration.  For example, one person suggested that, “…if more people spent 
their time working towards achieving what these people have, and less time complaining 
about them, New Zealand would be much better off.”  Other people gave examples of how 
Reynolds has improved Telecom’s performance.  For example, one apparent Telecom 
employee stated that, “This has been reflected with the steepest rise in staff engagement in our 
business ever recorded… he’s [Reynolds has] earned his bonus this year.”
Comments neutral towards Reynolds’ remuneration mainly included the absolute level, effort, 
and market logics.  The neutral comments tended to evaluate the media’s or another member 
of the public’s arguments, but without offering an explicit opinion on Reynolds’ remuneration.  
For example, one person commented, “As for Mr Reynolds, the board pays him what they 
think he is worth.”  The remuneration logics were used to support or refute the arguments of 
others, but without offering their own opinion.  For example, one person argued that, “I 
suspect Reynolds can demand “international pay” because he is internationally mobile. 
Therefore, a mobile commodity can demand international prices.”  Other neutral comments 
were positive or negative towards other aspects of Telecom’s business and related 
Government decisions.  For example, one person believed that, “The mistake was to have 
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privatised it [Telecom]. The ongoing mistake is in not replacing it [Telecom’s network] –
physically – with state owned fibre.”
Comments opposing Reynolds’ remuneration mainly included the absolute level and pay-for-
performance logics.  Paradoxically, Telecom’s board of directors argues that Reynolds’ 
remuneration is justified because it is linked to performance, whereas many members of the 
public argued that Reynolds’ remuneration was not related to performance.  For example, one 
person commented that, “I thought executives were bonused [sic] on performance… with 
profits down 43.9% he should be taking a 43.9% salary cut.” Other arguments focused on the 
ratio of CEO and average worker pay as well as political philosophy.  For example, one 
person contended that, “The argument that CEO’s are so much better than the rest of us they 
deserve incomes like 5 million per year is laughable. Its obvious that the big business 
propaganda machine has done its job and the vast majority of the moronic commentators on 
this page are sufficiently indoctrinated in right wing economic theory.”
The public’s comments traversed a wide range of issues, some of which were related to 
Reynolds’ remuneration.  The public’s comments often included tangential issues such as the 
history of Telecom and the technicians’ dispute over their contract. However, the depth of the 
public’s comments was limited.  For example, one shareholder believed that, “If we paid 
peanuts, we’d get another monkey, we don't want to go back to those days.” While many 
comments discussed the relative level of Reynolds’ remuneration, few comments made 
specific references to other CEOs’ remuneration.  Similarly, people did not evaluate the 
components of Reynolds’ remuneration in any depth.  For example, one person commented 
that, “I wonder how much he would have got if he actually increased profits!”  The critical 
distinction between cash and unrealised remuneration was rarely made by members of the 
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public.  The arguments of members of the public are mainly ideological or principle-based, 
rather than critiquing the process by which Reynolds’ remuneration is determined and the 
different remuneration schemes.
5.4. Comparative Analysis
In this section, Telecom’s, the media’s, and the public’s discourse on Reynolds’ remuneration 
are compared and contrasted.
5.4.1. Telecom’s and the Public’s Discourse
There are significant differences between the remuneration logics that Telecom and the public 
used. While both Telecom and the public used a variety of remuneration logics, the public’s 
arguments were simplistic compared to Telecom’s.  The public’s comments were mainly 
concerned with the absolute level of Reynolds’ remuneration, not recognising that half of the 
$7 million is unrealised for at least three years and largely dependent on total shareholder 
return targets. For example, one person argued that, “These executive salaries are obscene 
and a disgrace and the recession has revealed the inherent rot in the capitalist model”. 
Further, Telecom’s discourse was highly formalised and organised, whereas the public’s 
discourse was often unorganised and contained grammatical and spelling errors.  Telecom’s 
discourse appears to be more persuasive as a result.  
5.4.2. Telecom’s and the Media’s Discourse
Telecom’s discourse de-emphasised the amount of Reynolds’ remuneration. They did not 
include a total remuneration figure in the annual report.  Contrastingly, the media highlighted 
the amount of Reynolds’ remuneration.  Also, the media emphasised the opinions of those 
who opposed Reynolds’ remuneration.  For example, one headline read, “Union slams 
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Reynolds’ pay”.  While both Telecom and the media used the pay-for-performance logic, they 
used this logic in different ways.  The media reasoned that Reynolds’ pay was unjustified 
because Telecom’s profits have fallen, despite Telecom’s profits being greater than market 
analysts’ expectations.  Generally, the media’s discourse was unsophisticated.  They tended to 
describe Reynolds’ remuneration, although in limited detail, and then compare it to the 
average worker, the Prime Minister’s remuneration, or Telecom’s profits.  Again, the 
difference between cash and unrealised remuneration was not widely discussed.  Further, the 
different incentives schemes were not critiqued.  However, the blogs did examine Reynolds’ 
remuneration in greater depth, particularly Bruce Sheppard’s blog.
5.4.3. The Media’s and the Public’s Discourse
The media’s and the public’s discourse was quite similar. Both the media and the public 
focused on the absolute level of Reynolds’ remuneration and had unsophisticated evaluations 
of the remuneration schemes. Further, the agency logic was absent in both the media’s and 
public’s comments, indicating that they did not consider the shareholder’s perspective.  While 
Telecom’s profits and share price have certainly declined rapidly in recent years, Telecom’s 
performance relative to other telecommunications companies and NZX listed companies was 
rarely mentioned.  The media and the public tended to believe that a fall in the absolute level 
in profits should translate to a fall in the total CEO remuneration.  However, the public’s 
discourse used the remuneration logics is a greater extent than the media’s.  Also, the public’s 
comments were more opinion-based, whereas the media’s comments were more fact-based.
5.5. Postscript
While this research is concerned with Reynolds’ 2009 remuneration and events leading up to 
Telecom’s annual general meeting in October 2009, there are three significant events that 
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occurred after October 2009.  First, Telecom’s new mobile network failed repeatedly in 
February 2010 and this prompted the resurgence of media and public debate on Reynolds’ 
remuneration. For example, the Sunday Star Times headline on 28 February was, “Call to 
stop CEO’s $3m bonus”. The Sunday Star Times reported that Bruce Sheppard, who 
previously supported Reynolds’ 2009 remuneration, believed that Reynolds’ 2010 
remuneration should be cut as he should share the blame for the failure of the XT network.  
Some senior and middle managers resigned as a result of the XT network failures.  After the 
XT network’s reliability improved, the media’s and public’s interest in Telecom and 
Reynolds’ remuneration diminished once again.
Second, Reynolds’ 2010 remuneration was significantly lower than his 2009 remuneration. 
Consequently, the media’s and public’s interest in Reynolds’ 2010 remuneration was 
negligible.  In fact, there was only one newspaper article mentioning it.  Reynolds’ 2010 
remuneration was $5,072,614 (2009: $7,156,450) consisting of a salary of $1,750,000 (2009: 
$1,750,000), a performance incentive of $900,000 (2009: $3,062,500), performance rights 
and entitlements of $2,084,503 (2009: $2,100,000), and special payments of $338,111 (2009: 
243,950).  Cash remuneration was $2,628,111 (2009: $3,831,450) and unrealised 
remuneration was $2,444,503 (2009: $3,325,000).  Reynolds’ performance incentive declined 
71%, despite Telecom’s financial performance holding at 2009 levels.  Recall that Reynolds’ 
performance incentive increased in 2009 following a significant decrease in Telecom’s 
financial performance.  From an external perspective, the change in Reynolds’ remuneration 
is difficult to decipher.
Third, Telecom altered how Reynolds’ remuneration was disclosed in the 2010 annual report.
Figure 3 shows how Reynolds’ 2009 remuneration was disclosed.  While Reynolds’ total 
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remuneration is not shown, it can easily be derived by adding the figures.  It also shows 
Reynolds’ 2008 and 2009 performance incentives, highlighting a significant increase.  Figure 
4 shows how Reynolds’ 2010 remuneration was disclosed.  Both Reynolds’ total 
remuneration and the value of the long-term incentives are not shown in 2010. Only the 
number of performance rights and entitlements are given.  To calculate the value of these 
long-term incentives, “Note 22 Employee share schemes” on pages 102-104 must be read in 
conjunction with the disclosure on page 136.  Curiously, the value of the performance rights, 
$583,333, that have lapsed in 2010 is disclosed in footnote 3. Also, there is no comparison of 
performance incentive between 2009 and 2010.  Further, the different components of 
Reynolds’ remuneration are labelled “fixed” or “at risk”.  These cosmetic changes can only 
have been made to obfuscate Reynolds’ total remuneration and give the reader a more 
favourable impression of Reynolds’ remuneration.
---------------------------
Insert figure 3 here
---------------------------
---------------------------
Insert figure 4 here
---------------------------
6. Discussion
Organisations undertake certain actions to legitimise their operations within society. As one 
of the largest companies in New Zealand, Telecom is constantly in the spotlight of the public 
in regards to its company performance, operations and policies. Maintaining legitimacy is 
Legitimacy of CEO Pay Page 34 of 51
important for Telecom. However, it is difficult to know how much of Telecom’s 
organisational legitimacy depends on the legitimacy of Reynolds’ remuneration.  Telecom 
does provide significantly more disclosure on executive remuneration than is mandatory. Also, 
Wayne Boyd provided significantly more explanation of executive remuneration during 
Telecom’s 2009 annual general meeting than occurred at previous annual general meetings.  It 
appears that Telecom does attempt to manage the legitimacy of its executive remuneration 
practices. 
This is similar to the environmental disclosures by companies where researches has found that 
companies use disclosure as a legitimising tool (Patten, 2002; Cho and Patten, 2007). 
Companies may also use disclosures to enhance their reputation. Communication with 
stakeholders in society is important to build and maintain organisational legitimacy.  Being 
one of the largest companies in New Zealand, Telecom needs the support of the public and 
disclosing more information than is required by law may put Telecom in a favourable position 
as it is more transparent with its practices. Drawing from Deegan and Gordon’s (1996) 
findings, it can be said that Telecom has increased its executive remuneration disclosures due 
to society’s interest, thereby aiming to legitimise its practices. 
Consistent with legitimacy theory, previous research have found that companies use 
remuneration logics to justify executive remuneration practices (Wade, et al., 1997; Crombie, 
2009). This is evident in Telecom’s annual report and chairman’s speech at the annual general 
meeting, where a variety of logics were used to justify their executive remuneration practices. 
Telecom emphasised that a significant portion of Reynolds’ remuneration was linked to firm 
performance including financial and total shareholder return targets.  To strengthen Telecom’s 
rhetorical argument, Reynolds’ fixed remuneration was barely mentioned as this does not 
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vary with performance.  Other remuneration logics used also relate to Reynolds’ 
achievements.  However, the underlying assumption that incentives are required to motivate 
Reynolds is not discussed.
Failure of an organisation to meet societal expectations can lead to a loss of organisational 
legitimacy.  For example, customers could switch to a competitor and shareholders could sell 
their shares.  From the organisation’s point of view, managing legitimacy is about managing 
society’s perceptions. This is seen as a defence mechanism as to prevent or limit challenges 
from shareholders or the public. The findings show that Telecom has maintained its 
legitimacy as it was responsive to the media’s and public’s criticism of Reynolds’ 
remuneration. Telecom provided additional disclosures in the annual general meeting upon 
request by Bruce Sheppard which outlined Reynolds’ key performance indicators. Telecom 
also defended its legitimacy by publicly defending Reynolds’ remuneration and arguing that 
he has met the required performance targets. 
Consistent with Core et al.’s (2008, p.3) findings, the media acts as a “watchdog” for large 
organisations such as Telecom where its history and news attracts the public’s interest. The 
media also focuses on excess pay by sensationalising Reynolds’ pay in their headlines. 
However, the media does not appear to be as powerful as McCombs (2004) alleged. The 
media is only one stakeholder in society and they are not the most powerful. Organisations 
also tend to form their response based on society’s reaction to an event. In this case, the 
public’s response was diverse.  The public’s comments showed that the public was not afraid 
to disagree or agree with the opinions expressed in newspaper articles and blogs.
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7. Conclusion 
Telecom’s, the media’s, and the public’s discourse on executive remuneration share a 
common set of remuneration logics.  These remuneration logics represent principles which 
underpin how much and how Reynolds is remunerated.  The principles are open to 
interpretation.  For example, Telecom used the pay-for-performance logic to defence 
Reynolds’ remuneration, whereas the media and the public used the pay-for-performance 
logic to attack Reynolds’ remuneration.  The media’s and public’s opinions of Reynolds’ 
remuneration were heterogeneous.  Political ideology was an important determinant of the 
media’s and public’s opinion; people with right-wing views were supportive, while people 
with left-wing views were critical of Reynolds’ remuneration.  Overall, Telecom was able to 
defend Reynolds’ remuneration with relative ease; Boyd used a variety of remuneration logics 
to justify Reynolds’ remuneration in more depth than normal at the 2009 annual general 
meeting.  
The findings have significant implications for legitimacy theory.  Telecom’s organisational 
legitimacy is comprised of multiple dimensions, where the legitimacy of Reynolds’ 
remuneration is only one dimension.  By using a taken-for-granted set of remuneration logics 
(Crombie, 2009), Telecom was able to maintain its organisational legitimacy.  While the 
media sensationalised Reynolds’ remuneration and highlighted the decline in Telecom’s 
profits, they were not able to persuade the public that Reynolds’ remuneration and, by 
extension, Telecom was illegitimate.  In fact, the public’s reaction to Reynolds’ remuneration 
was heterogeneous, not homogenous.  To maintain legitimacy, Telecom only needed to 
appear legitimate in the eyes of powerful stakeholders.  However, there were long-term 
implications for Telecom as Reynolds’ remuneration in 2010 was much lower than in 2009 
and the disclosure of Reynolds’ remuneration in 2010 was altered to disguise the total amount 
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of remuneration paid.  This indicates that Telecom wanted to avoid a repeat of the media’s 
and public’s scrutiny of Reynolds’ remuneration.
The findings have significant practical implications.  The content analysis showed that the 
media and the public use a variety of remuneration logics to evaluate the efficacy of 
Reynolds’ remuneration, but the evaluation is relatively unsophisticated.  The media focused 
on how Telecom’s profit had declined and the ratio of CEO to average worker pay.  The 
public focused on whether Reynolds’ remuneration was justified in light of market conditions 
and his achievements.  However, the media’s and public’s evaluation rarely examined the 
components of Reynolds’ remuneration, how Reynolds’ remuneration is determined, and split 
between cash and unrealised remuneration.  Also, the media and public gave few examples of 
other CEO’s remuneration to illustrate whether Reynolds’ remuneration was unjustified or 
justified. To effectively critique Reynolds’ remuneration, a more sophisticated approach is 
needed.
This research is exploratory as there are few studies that have examined the legitimacy of 
CEO pay.  As news articles and blogs are typically saved on electronic databases, there is
much potential to study similar situations to Telecom and Reynolds’ 2009 remuneration.  For 
example, CEOs of major banks in the UK were not able to legitimately retain their bonuses in 
2009 (Financial Times, 22 February 2010).  Studying the discourse of these banks, the 
Government, media and the public could yield new insights into how organisations (fail to) 
manage their legitimacy.  Perhaps, the UK banks believed that the bonuses had to be forgone 
to maintain organisational legitimacy.  Alternatively, the banks’ rhetoric may not been 
persuasive.  They may not have employed remuneration logics to the same degree as Telecom, 
which could explain why the bonuses were not socially acceptable. Such studies could also 
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be replicated in the US, where banks and other firms were bailed out by the Government 
following the Global Financial Crisis, which led to much media and public scrutiny of 
executive remuneration.  By studying multiple instances of media and public scrutiny of 
executive remuneration, an in-depth understanding of the legitimacy of executive 
remuneration can be developed.
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Remuneration 
Logics
Explanations of CEO 
Pay
Empirical Evidence
Agency
Incentive schemes can be 
designed to align the 
interests of executives 
with those of 
shareholders.
The agency logic has been institutionalised in 
the U.S. and is often presented as a solution to 
poor performance (Zajac and Westphal, 1995) as 
well as when large bonuses are awarded (Wade 
et al. (1997). 
Experience
The CEO’s pay should 
reflect his/her experience 
or skills.
St-Onge et al. (2001) found that executives 
believe more share options are awarded to more 
experienced individuals.
Human 
Resources
As talented executives 
are a scarce resource, 
compensation is needed 
to attract and retain 
them.
Executives use the human resources logics to 
rationalise the adoption share option plans (St-
Onge et al., 2001). Point and Tyson (2006) 
found that the human resources logic has 
become taken-for-granted in the U.K.
Market
The CEO’s pay will 
depend on the market 
forces of supply and 
demand.
Executives believe that for an executive 
compensation scheme to be competitive, it must 
include a share option plan (St-Onge et al., 
2001).  
Motivation 
Incentive compensation 
schemes will enhance the 
CEO’s effort.
St-Onge et al. (2001) found that executives 
perceived share option plans as an important 
motivational tool.
Pay-for-
Performance
The CEO’s pay should 
be linked to the firm 
performance.
Wade et al. (1997) and Point and Tyson (2006) 
found that firms use the pay-for-performance 
logic to justify the CEO’s pay. 
Responsibility
Executive remuneration 
should be linked to the 
level of a CEO’s 
responsibility.
Executives believe that share options plans are 
most effective in situations where executives 
have high managerial discretion (St-Onge et al., 
2001).  
Table 1: Remuneration Logics in the Literature
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Table 2: The Remuneration Logics 
Remuneration 
Logics Description Example
Human 
Resources
CEO is viewed as a scarce resource 
and remuneration is needed to attract 
and retain the best talent.
“attract and retain top executives”
“attract the right talent”
Responsibility
The level of remuneration is 
determined on the complexity and 
position of the job in the company.
“scope and complexity of the role”
“these people make the big 
decisions in the company”
Market
The CEO’s pay depends on the forces 
of supply and demand, so the CEO’s 
remuneration should be comparable to 
their peers.
“competitive global market”
“Reynolds salary is a market price”
Effort
The company’s remuneration schemes 
are designed to reward the CEO for 
personal achievement.
“should be rewarded for it”
“deserved the $5million payout”
“The guy has worked hard…”
Target
The company’s remuneration schemes 
are designed to reward the 
achievement of company’s objectives 
or targets.
“he was set a target and met it”
“achieving pre-specified target 
levels of performance”
Agency
Remuneration schemes can be used to 
align the interests of the CEO with 
those of the shareholders.
“to closely align with the interests 
of shareholders”
Pay-for-
Performance
The CEO’s pay should be linked to the 
firm’s performance.
“average performance receiving a 
ridiculous payment”
“performance based”
Experience
The CEO’s remuneration is 
determined by their level of 
experience and value.
“international experience and 
value”
“Paul has a wealth of experience”
Absolute Level The CEO’s absolute level of pay is too high. 
“$5million is an obscene amount 
of money”
$5million income is close to 200 
times the minimum wage”
Contribution
The CEO’s remuneration is 
determined by their contribution to the 
company’s performance.
“what has he put into it”
“no one’s contribution actually 
earns millions”
Other
Other explanations that are not often 
mentioned such as fairness and the 
payment of tax
“fair and proper salary”
“both Reynolds and Telecom pay a 
tremendous amount of tax…”
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Year Revenue Net Profit After Tax Total Assets EPS DPS ROA ROE
1991 $   2,477,300 $      336,700 $   4,717,600 $   0.20 $   0.10 
1992 $   2,617,100 $      403,600 $   4,848,400 $   0.23 $   0.15 8% 15%
1993 $   2,511,400 $      107,000 $   4,755,500 $   0.30 $   0.18 2% 4%
1994 $   2,539,000 $      527,000 $   4,563,200 $   0.26 $   0.24 11% 24%
1995 $   2,868,800 $      619,600 $   4,562,700 $   0.32 $   0.30 14% 30%
1996 $   2,957,600 $      716,200 $   4,586,600 $   0.37 $   0.34 16% 34%
1997 $   3,133,500 $      580,900 $   4,618,300 $   0.37 $   0.38 13% 31%
1998 $   3,398,000 $      820,200 $   5,164,000 $   0.47 $   0.42 17% 61%
1999 $   3,496,000 $      888,000 $   5,242,000 $   0.50 $   0.45 17% 83%
2000 $   4,384,000 $      789,000 $   7,981,000 $   0.45 $   0.46 12% 71%
2001 $   5,705,000 $      661,000 $   8,972,000 $   0.52 $   0.20 8% 42%
2002 $   5,580,000 -$    187,000 $   8,246,000 $   0.41 $   0.20 -2% -11%
2003 $   5,206,000 $      709,000 $   7,755,000 $   0.40 $   0.20 9% 46%
2004 $   5,385,000 $      754,000 $   7,500,000 $   0.47 $   0.27 10% 38%
2005 $   5,759,000 $      916,000 $   7,421,000 $   0.42 $   0.38 12% 40%
2006 $   5,852,000 -$    435,000 $   6,203,000 -$  0.16 $   0.35 -6% -25%
2007 $   5,642,000 $   3,024,000 $   8,276,000 $   0.49 $   0.35 42% 131%
2008 $   5,793,000 $      710,000 $   7,405,000 $   0.48 $   0.29 9% 22%
2009 $   5,649,000 $      398,000 $   7,036,000 $   0.34 $   0.24 6% 15%
Average $   4,260,721 $      649,379 $   6,308,068 $   0.36 $   0.29 11% 36%
Table 3: Telecom’s Financial Performance from 1991 to 2009
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Company name
Market 
Capitalisation CEO Pay
CEO Pay to 
Market 
Capitalisation
(000) Rank (000) Rank (%) Rank
Fletcher Building Limited $3,977,386 1 $1,245 8 0.0313 20
Telecom Corporation of New 
Zealand Limited $3,630,113 2 $7,156 1 0.1971 5
Contact Energy Limited $3,373,309 3 $1,624 5 0.0481 17
Trustpower Limited $2,286,043 4 $1,010 15 0.0442 19
Vector Limited $2,151,628 5 $1,220 9 0.0567 16
Auckland International Airport 
Limited $1,972,642 6 $1,298 6 0.0658 14
Fisher & Paykel Healthcare 
Corporation Limited $1,680,360 7 $1,066 14 0.0634 15
Sky Network Television 
Limited $1,620,485 8 $1,288 7 0.0795 13
Sky City Entertainment Group 
Limited $1,306,882 9 $2,564 3 0.1962 6
The Warehouse Group Limited $1,241,672 10 $3,800 2 0.3060 1
Air New Zealand Limited $1,148,604 11 $2,441 4 0.2125 4
New Zealand Refining Co Ltd $1,050,000 12 $1,200 11 0.1143 9
Ryman Healthcare Limited $1,035,000 13 $470 20 0.0454 18
Port of Tauranga Limited $891,214 14 $710 17 0.0797 12
Infratil Limited $762,688 15 $1,010 16 0.1324 8
Mainfreight Limited $651,905 16 $1,140 12 0.1749 7
New Zealand Oil & Gas Limited $608,191 17 $545 18 0.0896 11
Sanford Limited $478,319 18 $545 19 0.1139 10
Fisher & Paykel Appliance 
Holdings Limited $449,026 19 $1,130 13 0.2517 3
Tower Limited $425,655 20 $1,217 10 0.2859 2
Average $1,537,056 $1,634 0.1294
Table 4: CEO Pay of Largest 20 Publicly-Listed Companies in New Zealand in 2009
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Year Total Telecom % of total articles on Telecom
1994 5 0 0
1995 4 0 0
1996 14 2 14
1997 21 3 14
1998 16 2 13
1999 18 3 17
2000 14 2 14
2001 5 0 0
2002 12 4 33
2003 14 2 14
2004 12 1 8
2005 22 0 0
2006 10 1 10
2007 23 5 22
2008 21 1 5
2009 40 10 25
Total 251 36 14
Table 5: New Zealand Herald’s Coverage of Executive Remuneration
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Date Event Synopsis
28/06/07 Announcement of new CEO, Dr. Paul Reynolds
Telecom announced that Dr. Paul Reynolds has 
been appointed as its new Chief Executive 
Officer, taking over from Theresa Gattung on 
27 September 2007. He was also appointed as 
Managing Director on 4 October 2007.
07/11/08 Quarter 1 Results Net Earnings for the period was $149,000,000 (Down 33.8% from September 2008 quarter).
13/02/09
Media release – Salary freeze 
for Telecom executives
Telecom’s CEO Paul Reynolds announced that 
Telecom’s executive team, and most senior 
managers, will not receive salary increases this 
year, as the company sharpens its focus on 
managing costs in the current economic 
environment. However, short- and long-term 
incentives were still paid, although this fact did 
not receive any media attention.
Quarter 2 results
Net Earnings for the period was $163,000,000 
(Down 58.9% from period ending December 
2008).
08/05/09 Quarter 3 results
Net Earnings for the period was $322,000,000 
(Down 23% from the period ending March 
2009).
21/08/09
Telecom Annual Report 
released
CEO remuneration and financial performance 
are disclosed in the annual report
Quarter 4 results Net Earnings for the period was $400,000,000 (Down 43.9% for the year ended June 2009).
25/08/09 Blog: Paul Reynolds Pay Written by “Cactus Kate”
26/08/09 Blogs: A Boil on the country’s backside; Telecom Board 
defends pay
Written by John Minto; newspaper article
01/09/09
Blog: Put a cap on eye-popping 
incomes; Notice of Annual 
Meeting of Shareholders
Written by John Minto
08/09/09 Corporate Review – Creating a profile of the 2009 financial 
year for Telecom
Telecom company document
29/09/09 Blog: Is Paul Reynolds worth his pay cheque? Written by Bruce Sheppard
1/10/09 Telecom AGM Annual General Meeting and discussions
Table 6: Timeline of Events related to Reynolds’ 2009 Remuneration
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Remuneration 
Logics
Telecom Media Public
Presence Rank Presence Rank Presence Rank
Absolute Level 0 / 2 11 10 / 12 1 63 / 122 1
Pay-for-
Performance
2 / 2 1= 6 / 12 2 18 / 122 4
Effort 2 / 2 1= 4 / 12 3= 30 / 122 2
Contribution 2 / 2 1= 0 / 12 10= 7 / 122 9
Target 2 / 2 1= 1 / 12 7= 11 / 122 8
Market 1 / 2 8= 2 / 12 5= 24 / 122 3
Human 
Resources
2 / 2 1= 1 / 12 7= 12 / 122 7
Responsibility 2 / 2 1= 2 / 12 5= 14 / 122 6
Experience 1 / 2 8= 1 / 12 7= 5 / 122 10
Agency 2 / 2 1= 0 / 12 10= 0 / 122 11
Other 1 / 2 8= 4 / 12 3= 15 / 122 5
Table 7: Remuneration Logics in the Discourse of Telecom, the Media, and the Public
Public
Tone Comments
Agree (Supportive) 33 or 27%
Neutral 43 or 35%
Disagreed (Unsupportive) 46 or 38%
Table 8: Tone of the Public’s Discourse
Public Tone
Themes Agreed Neutral Disagreed
Absolute Level 12 19 32
Effort 14 10 6
Market 9 8 7
Pay-for-Performance 3 3 12
Responsibility 8 3 3
Human Resources 6 4 2
Target 6 4 1
Contribution 4 1 2
Experience 3 1 1
Agency 0 0 0
Other 6 4 5
Table 9: Remuneration Logics Present in the Public’s Discourse
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Figure 1: Return Index of Telecom and NZX 
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Figure 2: CEO Remuneration at Telecom
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Figure 3: Disclosure of Dr. Paul Reynolds’ Remuneration in 2009
(Source: Telecom 2009 Annual Report, p.126)
Figure 4: Disclosure of Dr. Paul Reynolds’ Remuneration in 2010
(Source: Telecom 2010 Annual Report, p.136)
